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INTRODUCTION
Every year, upwards of 300,000 children (anyone under the age
of eighteen) are at risk for being commercially sexually exploited
(CSEC) in the United States.1 According to End Child Prostitution,
Child Pornography and Trafficking of Children (ECPAT-USA),
“(CSEC) in its primary forms is prostitution, pornography, sex tour-
ism, sex trafficking and sexual performance, in which a commercial
transaction is involved.” 2 The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of
2000 (TVPA) asserts all commercially sexually exploited persons
under the age of eighteen are victims of human trafficking.3 All fifty
states have also passed anti–human trafficking laws; however, CSEC-
specific state statutes vary widely in both content and number.4
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1. RICHARD J. ESTES & NEIL A. WEINER, THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF
CHILDREN IN THE U.S., CANADA, AND MEXICO 143, 146–50 (2002), http://news.findlaw.com
/hdocs/docs/sextrade/upenncsec90701.pdf.
2. END CHILD PROSTITUTION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, AND TRAFFICKING OF CHILDREN
FOR SEXUAL PURPOSES, Frequently Asked Questions (Aug. 20, 2016, 3:42 PM), http://
www.ecpatusa.org/faqs [http://perma.cc/92YX6JRV].
3. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C.A. § 7102 (West 2015).
4. Cheryl Nelson Butler, Bridge Over Troubled Water: Safe Harbor Laws for Sexually
Exploited Minors, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1281, 1310–11 (2015).
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Examining CSEC legislation at the state level is essential be-
cause local law enforcement, social workers, and other first respond-
ers are usually the first to come in contact with CSEC victims and
exploiters.5 Furthermore, even though federal laws such as the TVPA
articulate that all persons under the age of eighteen who are com-
mercially sexually exploited are not criminals, the law has limited
effects.6 Lack of federal resources and difficulty of prosecuting federal
CSEC cases are often cited as the primary shortcomings in enforcing
this federal statute.7 Consequently, the specific character of state
legislation in regards to CSEC heavily impacts the experience of vic-
tims upon contact with the state, determining, for example, whether
victims experience increased contact with the criminal justice sys-
tem or social service agencies.8
This study aims to understand which state-level factors are
associated with states passing more comprehensive anti-CSEC laws.
A groundswell of CSEC-related legislation has passed in recent
years; however, little research has been done about what specific
influences may be driving this increase in legislative activity.9 This
analysis provides a thorough investigation of these patterns of asso-
ciations to better understand how strong CSEC legislation is passed.
Additionally, this research is survivor-led, which heeds the growing
call for survivors’ perspectives to be central in shaping CSEC policy
and practice.10
This Article first focuses on the history of CSEC legislation in the
United States by contextualizing the history of state anti-trafficking
laws within the larger anti-trafficking policy framework of federal
U.S. statutes and United Nations’ (U.N.) protocols. The second and
third sections address the variables, statistical model, and results of
our data analysis. The fourth section discusses the implications of
these findings. The Article concludes with practical considerations
for future CSEC legislative efforts on the state level.
5. See Melynda H. Barnhart, Sex and Slavery: An Analysis of Three Models of State
Human Traff icking Legislation, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 83, 87, 129 (2009); see
also Melissa Dess, Note, Walking the Freedom Trail: An Analysis of the Massachusetts
Human Trafficking Statute and Its Potential to Combat Child Sex Trafficking, 33 B.C.
J.L. & SOC. JUST. 147, 151–52 (2013).
6. See Butler, supra note 4, at 1301–02.
7. Id. at 1303.
8. See id. at 1310–13.
9. See id. at 1310.
10. See Confronting Commercial Sexual Exploitation and Sex Trafficking of Minors
in the United States 1, 255 (Ellen Wright Clayton, Richard D. Krugman, & Patti Simon
eds., 2013), http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/243838.pdf; see also OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
PRESIDENT’S INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS, FED. STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN ON SERVS. FOR VICTIMS OF HUM. TRAFFICKING
IN THE U. S. 2013–2017 1, 10 (2013), http://www.ovc.gov/pubs/FederalHumanTrafficking
StrategicPlan.pdf.
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Social theorist Emile Durkheim posited that laws are a reflection
of a society’s value system.11 Thus, the drafting and passage of legis-
lation can be viewed as a state’s public declaration of its position and
intentions toward addressing CSEC.12 This theoretical framework
is particularly important to consider when examining variation within
each state’s anti-trafficking legislation. State laws vary widely on
how specific aspects of CSEC are addressed, such as retaining the
right to arrest a victim if the child does not comply with law enforce-
ment, or prohibiting a sex buyer who is being prosecuted from utilizing
a defense that a child consented.13 These specific statutes hold real-
life consequences for commercially sexually exploited children’s over-
all well-being and quality of life, especially if children are incarcerated
for prostitution and denied much needed CSEC-specific support and
health services.14
I. HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Despite recent increased awareness of CSEC, the United States
first addressed the commercial sexual exploitation of children legisla-
tively in 1910 by implementing the Mann Act.15 Also known as the
White Slave Traffic Act, this federal legislation outlawed the inter-
state or international transportation of women and girls, particu-
larly immigrants brought to America, for forced prostitution.16 This
law was adopted after the 1904 League of Nations International
Agreement for Suppression of the White Slave Traffic.17 It addressed
increased concerns over a growing “white slave” market after prostitu-
tion was legalized in Europe and white women and girls were being
kidnapped and then transported across countries to work in brothels.18
We must note the racist origins of anti-trafficking legislation, which
only considered the commercial sexual exploitation and immorality
of white women and girls.19 This prioritization is consistent with a
11. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 73, 80–81 (George Simpson
trans., Free Press of Glencoe 1960) (1933).
12. See id. at 73, 81.
13. Butler, supra note 4, at 1307–08, 1335–37.
14. See Malika Saada Saar et al., The Sexual Abuse to Prison Pipeline: A Girls’ Story
1, 12–15 (2015), http://rights4girls.org/wp-content/uploads/r4g/2015/02/2015_COP_Sexual
-abuse_layout_web-1.pdf.
15. Butler, supra note 4, at 1300.
16. Dess, supra note 5, at 163–64.
17. Rebecca L. Wharton, Note, A New Paradigm for Human Traff icking: Shifting the
Focus from Prostitution to Exploitation in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 16 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 753, 759–60 (2010).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 759–60, 760 n.48.
4 WILLIAM  & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 23:001
historical legacy in America of people of color, particularly women
and girls, being viewed as hypersexual and “rapeable.” 20
Additionally, the 1949 United Nations Protocol Amending the In-
ternational Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic
and the International Convention for the Suppression of the White
Slave Traffic were particularly important to U.S. CSEC legislation.21
These laws introduced the terminology of “force, fraud, or coercion”
to describe lack of consent as the means by which human beings could
be identified as human trafficking victims, which expanded the pre-
vious kidnapping definition.22 In the TVPA of 2000, authors of the
bill utilized the same “force, fraud, or coercion” language to define
lack of consent for human trafficking victims.23 Although impor-
tantly the TVPA states that for children (persons under the age of
eighteen), proof of “force, fraud, or coercion” need not be demonstrated
for youth to receive protections and services.24
The passage of the TVPA in 2000, however, was not a blanket
solution for addressing CSEC in the U.S. It was the view of many
anti-CSEC advocates that in practice the enforcement of TVPA
focused more on protecting foreign-born trafficking victims than U.S.-
born victims, who were still being treated as criminals.25 In 2005,
the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA)
acknowledged these concerns by including new provisions to raise
awareness about U.S.-born CSEC victims such as expanding vic-
tims’ services, identifying American homeless and runaway youth
as having increased risk for CSEC, and mandating additional CSEC
training for law enforcement.26 Further federal CSEC protections
were enacted with the Justice for Victims Trafficking Act (JVTA) of
2015 which expanded numerous anti-CSEC initiatives such as
20. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUS-
NESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 129 (2d. ed. 2000) (ebook). The term “white
slavery” omits the reality that people of color were also exploited in brothels during this
time. See Cheryl Nelson Butler, The Racial Roots of Human Trafficking, 62 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1464, 1490 (2015). Additionally, the prioritized concern for the safety of white women
and girls continues to this day through law enforcement with women and children of color
being arrested and detained for prostitution at higher rates than whites. See, e.g., Vednita
Nelson, Prostitution: Where Racism & Sexism Intersect, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 81, 85
(1993) (discussing racism and sexual exploitation); Saar et al., supra note 14, at 9–12
(discussing the criminalization of trauma symptoms, especially for girls of color).
21. Wharton, supra note 17, at 761–62.
22. Id.
23. Elzbieta M. Gozdziak & Elizabeth A. Collett, Research on Human Trafficking in
North America: A Review of Literature, in DATA AND RESEARCH ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING:
A GLOBAL SURVEY 99, 105–06 (Frank Laczko & Elzbieta Gozdziak eds., 2005).
24. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9)(A).
25. See Megan Annitto, Consent, Coercion, and Compassion: Emerging Legal Responses
to the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 39–40 (2011).
26. See id. at 41–42.
2016] VOTING TO END VULNERABILITY 5
increased victim services funding, further protective legal statutes,
and additional resources for online CSEC investigations.27
In 2004, the Department of Justice (DOJ) suggested model leg-
islation (Model Law) for states to adopt.28 The Model Law mirrored
many aspects of the TVPA, particularly the “three p’s”: prevention,
protection, and prosecution.29 The Model Law addressed CSEC by
including a “Sexual Servitude of a Minor” section, which articulated
that persons under the age of eighteen are not required to provide
proof of force, fraud, or coercion to be considered human trafficking
victims.30 Yet, despite these DOJ recommendations, most state anti-
trafficking legislation chose to retain the right to criminalize per-
sons under the age of eighteen for prostitution.31 The two primary
arguments against decriminalization are ongoing debates about age
of consent to sex for minors, and jailing CSEC victims as a way to
keep them safe from exploiters.32
A primary strategy for opposing such criminalization of minors
for prostitution is the passage of state “Safe Harbor” laws, which focus
on protecting CSEC victims.33 While there is little consensus amongst
advocates and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who support
Safe Harbor laws about which specific provisions to include in the
legislation, the two key policy areas of interest are protecting CSEC
victims from criminal and juvenile prosecution, and diverting CSEC
victims from juvenile justice programs to child welfare agencies and
CSEC-specific service providers.34 As of July 2016, thirty-four states
have enacted Safe Harbor laws, however, these state statutes vary sig-
nificantly.35 For instance, ten states fully decriminalize CSEC for
persons under eighteen, two states limit the age of decriminalization
to sixteen, and the remaining states retain the right to arrest minors
for prostitution.36
27. Justice for Victims Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, 129 Stat. 227 (2015).
28. Barnhart, supra note 5, at 101 n.96.
29. See id. at 101–02, 106–10.
30. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED LEGISLATION: DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE MODEL STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING CRIMINAL STATUTE 68 (2007), http://www.csg
.org/knowledgecenter/docs/pubsafety/ModelStateAnti-TraffickingCriminalStatute.pdf.
31. Elizabeth S. Barnert et al., Identifying Best Practices for “Safe Harbor” Legislation
to Protect Child Sex Trafficking Victims: Decriminalization Alone is Not Sufficient, 51
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 249, 250 (2016).
32. See Butler, supra note 4, at 1307 (discussing age of consent); Susan Crile, Com-
ment, A Minor Conflict: Why the Objectives of Federal Sex Trafficking Legislation Pre-
empt the Enforcement of State Prostitution Laws against Minors, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1783,
1790–91 (2011).
33. See Barnert, supra note 31, at 249–50.
34. Butler, supra note 4, at 1304–05.
35. POLARIS PROJECT, HUMAN TRAFFICKING ISSUE BRIEF (Fall 2015), https://polaris
project.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Safe%20Harbor%20Issue%20Brief.pdf.
36. See END CHILD PROSTITUTION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND TRAFFICKING OF CHILDREN
FOR SEXUAL PURPOSES, Steps to Safety: A Guide to Drafting Safe Harbor Legislation to
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II. MEASURING PROGRESS IN COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
OF CHILDREN STATE LEGISLATION
A. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the following analyses is a score based
on Shared Hope International’s annual State Report Card series.
Shared Hope is an anti-CSEC NGO founded by former U.S. and Wash-
ington State Congresswomen Linda Smith.37 The annual Report Card
series, which was first published in 2011, creates a framework to track
states’ annual legislative progress in addressing CSEC statutes.38
To calculate the annual Shared Hope score each state receives 2.5
points for every one of forty-one provisions Shared Hope deems neces-
sary to comprehensively address CSEC at the state level (102.5 is the
maximum score each state can receive).39 States are given credit only
for statutory changes passed by state legislatures: executive orders
or regulatory changes are not counted. Provisions were chosen based
on interviews with approximately 300 advocates and service provid-
ers throughout the United States about “limitations placed on their
ability to implement effective trafficking responses due to inade-
quate state laws.” 40 Shared Hope scores are a subjective evaluation
of the impact of CSEC-specific state statutes that address all aspects
of CSEC, including: decriminalization of CSEC victims, CSEC victim
protection and service provision, and trafficker, facilitator, and buyer
prosecution.41 Therefore, Shared Hope scores reflect states’ ability
to respond to the needs of CSEC victims in multiple areas; scores are
not simply a count of bills passed each year.42 For instance, states that
fully decriminalize CSEC have a higher Shared Hope score than
states that do not.43 Shared Hope’s annual Report Card series is widely
regarded within the anti-trafficking movement as a reliable tool to
track progress of state CSEC legislation.44
Protect Sex-Trafficked Children (2015), http://www.ecpatusa.org/np-content/uploads/2016
/01/steps-to-safety.pdf [http://perma.cc/8RRN6VS4] [hereinafter Steps to Safety].
37. STATE REPORT CARDS, SHARED HOPE INTERNATIONAL, PROTECTED INNOCENCE
CHALLENGE: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PROTECTION FOR THE NATION’S CHILDREN 1 (2015),
https://sharedhope.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/PIC2015REPORT2.pdf [hereinafter
2015 REPORT CARDS].
38. Id.
39. Id. at 27.
40. STATE REPORT CARDS, SHARED HOPE INTERNATIONAL, PROTECTED INNOCENCE
CHALLENGE: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PROTECTION FOR THE NATIONS CHILDREN 1 (2014),
http://sharedhope.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/2014%20Protected%20Innocence%20
Challenge%20Report.pdf [hereinafter 2014 REPORT CARDS].
41. Id. at 21.
42. See id. at 9.
43. See 2015 REPORT CARDS, supra note 37, at 10–14.
44. See 2014 REPORT CARDS, supra note 40, at 1.
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Figure 1 displays the change in Shared Hope scores from 2011–
2015 for all states, and illustrates the dramatic increase in CSEC-
related legislative activity in recent years. Figure 2 provides the
geographic distribution of Shared Hope Score in 2015. Despite the
national trend of convergence upon higher average scores, states
continue to exhibit substantial variation in the extent of their anti-
CSEC policies. This figure indicates that southern states have been
more aggressive in pursuing anti-CSEC legislation, on average, and
northeastern states less so. Figure 3 contains a scatter plot display-
ing state Shared Hope scores in 2011 against a state’s change in
their score between 2011 and 2015. The strong negative association
indicates a “catch up” effect in which states with lower scores in
2011 have seen the largest increases in their scores between 2011
and 2015. It appears that in the context of rapidly changing norms
in regards to anti-CSEC legislation, many states with less compre-
hensive anti-CSEC policies in 2011 have made significant policy
changes in an effort to keep up. Simultaneously, the continuing pas-
sage of legislative improvements (from the perspective of advocates
at Shared Hope) by states that already had high scores has contin-
ued to raise the upper limit. In the analyses below we seek to better
understand both this variation in scores across states and why some
states have experienced more accelerated increases in the compre-
hensiveness of their CSEC legislation over this period.
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B. Independent Variables
There are very few quantitative analyses of state-level CSEC
legislation, and the following analyses are the first effort to explain
variation in a comprehensive measure of overall CSEC policies (to
our knowledge). As such, there is little existing empirical work in
this specific policy area to guide the selection of independent vari-
ables. Instead, we have relied on our more general knowledge of the
state policymaking process as well as experience as an on-the-ground
advocate for anti-CSEC legislation, respectively.
State Government Institutional Responses to CSEC: State-level
human trafficking task forces have become increasingly common in
recent years, with forty-six states having a task force in 2015, up
from twenty-nine in 2011. Some state anti-trafficking legislation man-
dated the creation of a statewide human trafficking task force, while
other states voluntarily created human trafficking task forces to
address growing concerns about this issue.45 Task forces provide an
institutional point of focus for anti-trafficking, anti-CSEC advocates,
and NGOs, as well as an additional venue for the diffusion of state
legislation.46 Given that a major function of a state human traffick-
ing task force would be to encourage the passage of anti-trafficking
legislation, we expect states with task forces to have higher Shared
Hope scores on average. In addition, many states have passed Safe
Harbor laws that decriminalize the experiences of CSEC victims to
varying degrees and provide CSEC-specific services to victims.47 As
Safe Harbor laws signal a strong state position on the treatment of
victims of CSEC, we expect states with Safe Harbor laws to have
higher Shared Hope scores.48
Partisan and Gender Composition of State Legislatures: In the
context of deep partisan polarization, in recent years it has become
increasingly difficult to find policies that are genuinely bipartisan.49
45. Steps to Safety, supra note 36, at 2.
46. Interview by Kate Price with Lisa Goldblatt, Dir. & Co-founder, My Life, My
Choice, in Bos., Mass. (Oct. 2, 2015).
47. Crile, supra note 32, at 1792.
48. Given that the Shared Hope scores provide a comprehensive assessment of state
anti-CSEC polices, the character of state Safe Harbor legislation is incorporated into state
scores in some years. See 2015 REPORT CARDS, supra note 37, at 16–19. In order to avoid
any forced correlation between the Safe Harbor variable and the Shared Hope outcome,
we have modified the Shared Hope scores to remove any points attributable to state Safe
Harbor laws.
49. See, e.g., Political Polarization in the American Public, Pew Research Center
(June 12, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-amer
ican-public [https://perma.cc/863HW6QM]; Amanda Terkel, 112th Congress Set To Be-
come Most Unproductive Since 1940s, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2012, 8:00 AM),
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Anti-CSEC legislation might be an exception. The national trend of
increasing Shared Hope scores nationwide suggests that essentially
all states regardless of partisan control have been passing legisla-
tion.50 In order to examine whether there is a partisan dynamic to
this trend we examine whether a state having a larger percentage
of Republican state legislators impacts their scores.51
A large body of research exists examining the extent to which
the representation of women in governing bodies impacts policy
outcomes and, specifically, the extent to which this presence results
in policies that support women.52 We are not attempting here to
characterize CSEC as a women’s issue; rather we are simply explor-
ing whether a larger presence of female legislators, measured here
simply as the percentage of women legislators, impacts state Shared
Hope scores.53 We should state at the outset that there are multiple
reasons to suspect this factor will not be influential. For one, there is
substantial debate, and skepticism, as to whether numerical repre-
sentation in governing bodies actually corresponds with real influence
on legislative processes.54 Second, the most comprehensive research on
the voting patterns of women in U.S. state legislatures to date finds
that when women vote they primarily do so as partisans and rarely
cross party lines.55
Interest Groups: The presence of social movements is known to be
significantly associated with progressive social policy change.56 Anti-
CSEC NGOs are an integral part of the anti-trafficking movement
through awareness-raising campaigns, collaborating with political
champions to pass effective legislation, and coalition-building with
http://www.huff ingtonpost.com/2012/12/28/congress-unproductive_n_2371387.html
[https://perma.cc/C6H9KNGG]; Glenn C. Altschuler, Partisanship, Polarization and the
Future of American Politics, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 04, 2016, 7:44 AM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/glenn-c-altschuler/partisanship-polarization_b_11330384.html [http://
perma.cc/M9GU48YU].
50. See 2015 REPORT CARDS, supra note 37, at 1 (examining legislation in all 50 states).
51. Compare State Partisan Composition, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLA-
TURES (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisan-com
position.aspx#2016 [https://perma.cc/4YYPUSE7], with 2015 REPORT CARDS, supra note
37, at 10–14.
52. See Amy Caiazza, Does Women’s Representation in Elected Office Lead to Women-
Friendly Policy? Analysis of State-Level Data, 26 WOMEN & POL. 35, 59–60 (2004).
53. See CURRENT NUMBERS, CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN AND POL. (2016), http://www.cawp
.rutgers.edu/current-numbers [http://perma.cc/9MLX4XX2].
54. See Kimberly Cowell-Meyers & Laura Langbein, Linking Women’s Descriptive &
Substantive Representation in the United States, 5 POL. & GENDER 491, 492 (2009).
55. Tracy L. Osborn, How Women Represent Women: Political Parties, Gender & Rep-
resentation in the State Legislatures 7 (2012).
56. Mala Htun & S. Laurel Weldon, The Civic Origins of Progressive Policy Change:
Combating Violence against Women in Global Perspective, 1975–2005, 106 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 548, 564–65 (2012).
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other community stakeholders. To measure the potential impact of
NGOs on the passage of comprehensive CSEC legislation, we esti-
mated the average annual count of anti-CSEC NGOs in each state
during the years 2011–2014. Data was gathered utilizing three on-
line tools: GuideStar, an online database of non-profit organizations;
state-specific resource guides produced by Polaris Project and Girls
Education and Mentoring Services (GEMS), two leading anti-CSEC
NGOs; and a general search of popular search engines. A limitation
of this data collection method is the subjective nature of online
queries; however, we did ensure that saturation was reached for each
state’s list of NGOs. This count variable was highly skewed and
enters all models in a logged form. We anticipate that states with
more anti-CSEC NGOs will have higher Shared Hope scores.
Religious Composition: Faith-based organizations are highly pres-
ent within the anti-trafficking movement.57 For many years the issue
of trafficking of children has been of major concern to members of
Evangelical congregations and political organizations.58 The impact of
Evangelical organizations and faith-based activists on the passage
of state level CSEC legislation likely operates through multiple ave-
nues including lobbying, the relative electoral success of Republican
politicians, and public opinion.59 As a rough proxy for these various
mechanisms we examine whether the percentage of Evangelical resi-
dents in a state is associated with their Shared Hope score. We ob-
tained these data from the 2010 wave of the Religious Congregations
& Membership in the United States survey.60 This survey provides
the best available estimates of religious adherence, broken down by
religious tradition, at the state level.61 A widely known limitation of
this survey is that it suffers from significant undercounts of particu-
lar denominations.62 Given that historically African-American denom-
inations are particularly likely to be underrepresented in this survey,
we regard our measure of Evangelical state residents as a measure
of white Evangelical adherents.63
57. See Gretchen Soderlund, Running from the Rescuers: New U.S. Crusades Against
Sex Trafficking and the Rhetoric of Abolition, 17 NAT’L WOMEN’S STUD. ASS’N J. 64, 68
(2005).
58. See id. at 81.
59. See id. at 68–69.
60. Clifford Grammich et al., U.S. Religion Census 2010 Summary Findings: Reli-
gious Congregations & Membership Study, 2012 ASS’N STATISTICIANS OF AM. RELIGIOUS
BODIES 6.
61. Roger Finke & Christopher P. Scheitle, Accounting for the Uncounted: Computing
Correctives for the 2000 RCMS Data, 47 REV. OF RELIGIOUS RES. 5, 5 (2005).
62. See id. at 5–6.
63. Id. at 15.
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Proxy measure for children vulnerable to CSEC: Living in poverty
is one of the top risk factors for CSEC.64 Lack of economic, educa-
tional, and safe housing options can leave children vulnerable to
manipulative adults who groom neglected youth for sexual exploita-
tion with false promises of stability and security.65 As an approxi-
mate gauge of this risk factor we explore whether the average per
capita number of children living below the federal poverty line from
2011–2014 in a state is associated with their Shared Hope score. Data
was obtained from the Kids Count Data Center at the Annie E. Casey
Foundation, a private charitable children’s rights organization in
the United States, which compiles U.S. Census Bureau data.66
Proxy measure of state prevalence of CSEC: Understanding the
scope of CSEC within each state is essential to measure motivations
for passing comprehensive state-level legislation. We utilized the aver-
age annual per capita number of sex trafficking–specific calls and
texts to the National Human Trafficking Resource Center (NHTRC)
hotline over the years 2011–2014 as a rough estimate to determine
the magnitude of sex trafficking in each state.67 The NHTRC hotline
is a toll-free, twenty-four seven confidential communication center
that connects human trafficking victims to services, and accepts tips
of suspected human trafficking activity.68 The NHTRC was founded
by the NGO Polaris Project and is currently funded by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services and private donations.69
We recognize that there are multiple potential issues with this mea-
sure, but we consider this variable one of the better amongst many
flawed options for capturing differences in CSEC prevalence across
states. We expect that states with more CSEC may be more likely
to pursue anti-CSEC legislative efforts.
Controls: As was evident in Figure 1 there is a very strong trend
of increasing passage of anti-CSEC legislation over time as more
and more states substantially increase their Shared Hope scores.
This issue area has clearly increased in prominence as a political
issue and has diffused widely across state parties and legislatures.70
64. Mimi H. Silbert & Ayala M. Pines, Entrance into Prostitution, 13 YOUTH AND SOC’Y
471, 472, 486–88 (1982); ESTES & WEINER, supra note 1, at 3.
65. Clayton et al., supra note 10, at 107.
66. Annie E. Casey Foundation, KIDS COUNT DATA CENTER (2016), http://datacenter
.kidscount.org [https://perma.cc/8X5K3RQB].
67. NATIONAL HUMAN TRAFFICKING RESOURCE CENTER, Hotline Statistics, http://traf
f ickingresourcecenter.org/states [http://perma.cc/4G3PC6VT].
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See 2014 REPORT CARDS, supra note 40, at 29.
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We control for the trend driven by these relatively intangible dy-
namics with series of dichotomous variables for each year except
2011. Last, a handful of state legislatures are on a biannual schedule
holding legislative sessions every other year.71 We control for these
states’ inability to change scores in years without a legislative ses-
sion with a dichotomous indicator of no legislative session.
Statistical Model: The Shared Hope scores are available for all
states for the years 2011–2015. In order to identify the state level
factors associated with higher or lower scores we use a cross-sectional
time-series approach. Two states, Louisiana and Wyoming, were
identified as unduly influential outliers and were dropped from all
analyses. Consequently, all models examine a set of 240 state-year
observations. A Lagrangian multiplier test confirmed the expected
presence of random effects, significant differences across states, and
supporting the use of a random effects modeling approach. In addi-
tion, in order to test whether an important assumption required for
this modeling approach was met, a Hausman test was performed
and indicated a preference for a random effects model. Last, a modi-
fied Wald test indicated the presence of heteroskedasticity. Given
this we use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in all models.
III. FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH COMPREHENSIVE CHILD
SEX TRAFFICKING STATE LEGISLATION
A. Results
Table 1 contains the results of six models examining the extent
to which various factors are associated with state Shared Hope scores.
Models 1–4 include a series of dichotomous year variables to control for
the strong trend of increasing Shared Hope scores nationwide. These
dummy variables are highly significant and indicate that roughly
three quarters of the variance explained by these models is attribut-
able to this nationwide trend of increased activity in regards to anti-
CSEC legislation. (Figure 3 illustrates the change in each state’s
Shared Hope scores between 2011–2015.) In addition to being one
of the primary explanatory forces identified in these analyses, it is
important to emphasize that the strength of this trend impacts our
interpretation of the other factors in this model substantially. For
71. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES: ANNUAL VERSUS BIENNIAL
LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS (2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/an
nual-versus-biennial-legislative-sessions.aspx [http://perma.cc/PBD3Q2Q5].
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example, the positive impact of the percentage of state GOP legisla-
tors indicates that after controlling for the nationwide positive trend
in Shared Hope scores in which all states are experiencing rising
scores (on average), states with more Republican legislators have
higher scores than those with fewer GOP legislators. However, it
does not mean that legislatures controlled by Democrats have not
increased their scores. They have, but legislatures with more Republi-
cans have done so to a more substantial degree.
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Beyond this temporal trend, the results of Model 3 indicate that
four factors are significantly associated with state differences in
Shared Hope scores: the presence of a Safe Harbor law, the proportion
of GOP state legislators, the proportion of state legislators that are
women, and the percentage of white Evangelical residents. The inter-
pretation of the coefficients in cross-sectional time-series analysis is
slightly complicated as they capture both the effects of variation
across states and within states over time. In the case of a dichotomous
variable, such as the variable indicating whether a state has passed
a Safe Harbor law, the interpretation is more straightforward. For
example, in our Model 3, which contains all factors examined, this
model suggests that states and “state-years” in which a state has a
Safe Harbor law exhibit a Shared Hope score which is roughly three 
points higher on average than is the case in “state-years” without a
Safe Harbor law. In other words, these coefficients capture both the
impact of a state having a law or not continuously (between-state
differences in Shared Hope scores on average) as well as the impact
of a state passing a law (the within-state difference as a state’s score
changes over time).
The interpretation of our continuous independent variables is
only slightly more complex. These factors, such as the percentage of
GOP state legislators, capture the average effect of a one-unit change
in the independent variable over time and between states. As such
an interpretation is not intuitive, we illustrate the impact on Shared
Hope scores of different state characteristics in Figure 4. Figure 4
demonstrates the contribution of various significant factors in
Model 3 to the predicted Shared Hope scores of states at various
levels of these factors. “High” and “low” in this figure are defined as
one standard deviation above the mean and one standard deviation
below the mean respectively. Beginning with partisan control of
state legislatures, controlling for all other factors, a state with a
proportion of GOP legislators one standard deviation above the mean
would be expected to have a Shared Hope score roughly seven points
higher than a state with a percentage of GOP legislators one stan-
dard deviation below the mean, but otherwise with identical charac-
teristics. Similarly, a state with a “high” proposition of women state
legislators would have a score six points higher than a state with a
“low” percentage of female legislators (on average, controlling for all
other factors). Last, a state with a “high” proportion of white Evan-
gelical residents would be predicted to have a score roughly seven
points higher than a state with a “low” percentage of Evangelicals.
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While it is difficult to reconnect these differences in state scores with
on-the-ground impact of these policy choices, it should be noted that
these are rather large impacts on state scores. In 2015, the differ-
ence between the maximum and minimum score was thirty-seven
points. In the context of this type of range in actual scores, a seven-
point difference represents nearly one-fifth of this maximum differ-
ence between states in scores.
At this point, it is also worth emphasizing the factors that are
not significant. The number of Polaris phone calls, the child poverty
rate, the number of foster children, and the number of reported
cases of abuse are insignificant in full models (the latter two tested
in models not shown).72 Our best attempts to find proxy measures
72. In addition to child poverty we explored whether a number of potential proxy
measures of child vulnerability to CSEC were associated with state policies. A history
of child sexual abuse and/or neglect and living in foster care are widely recognized as two
additional leading CSEC risk factors. See, e.g., Silbert & Pines, supra note 64, at 408
(connecting history of child sexual abuse as a top risk factor for sexual exploitation);
Kimberly J. Mitchell et al., Conceptualizing Juvenile Prostitution as Child Maltreatment:
Findings from the National Juvenile Prostitution Study, 15 CHILD MALTREATMENT 18,
19 (2009) (citing presence of child sexual abuse with sexually exploited children).
We selected the per capita number of children with confirmed cases of physical and
sexual abuse and/or neglect in each state and the per capita number of children living
in each state’s foster care system as additional proxies for children vulnerable to CSEC.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD MALTREATMENT 2014, 21
(Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/f iles/cb/cm2014.pdf (discussing con-
firmed cases of abuse and/or neglect); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Children
in Public Foster Care on September 30th of Each Year Who Are Waiting to Be Adopted
FY 2005–FY 2014 (2015), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/children_waiting
2014.pdf ( listing the number of children in each state’s foster care system). Inconsistent
reporting and lack of mandatory reporting protocols are limitations of both measures.
See, e.g., Mitchell et al. Furthermore, incidence of under-reporting in child sexual abuse
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that capture the severity of the CSEC problem in a state, or a least
the size of the vulnerable population, all appear to be unrelated to
legislative activity concerned with CSEC.73 The child poverty rate
is significant in reduced models but this disappears when one con-
trols for the size of the white Evangelical population. These two factors
are highly correlated (.65), but full model results consistently sug-
gest that the correlation between child poverty and higher Shared
Hope scores is spurious and is in fact a product of the larger white
Evangelical communities in the states with more poor children. Last,
we were surprised to see that the number of human trafficking NGOs
in a state is unrelated to the level of legislative activity. In separate
analyses (not shown) we examined the state-level factors associated
with the passage of Safe Harbor laws. The only significant predictor
in those analyses was the measure of state anti-trafficking NGOs.
As a result, it is very likely that some of the impact of NGOs on
state scores is captured by the Safe Harbor law variable.
Given that partisan control is important to the passage of legis-
lation generally, and the fact that we find partisan differences here
in regards to the passage of CSEC legislation, we examined whether
the activity of these legislatures is enhanced in different contexts.
Through a series of interaction effects, we tested whether Republican-
controlled legislatures were more or less active in the context of more
NGOs, more white Evangelical residents, more female legislators (or
more female Republican state legislators), or in the context of states
with higher child poverty rates. Only one of these interactions was
significant, shown in Model 4, indicating that states with more GOP
legislators and more poor children have been particularly likely to
have higher Shared Hope scores. Figure 5, using the definitions of
“high” and “low” described above, demonstrates the dynamic cap-
tured by this interaction effect, and suggests this is a rather sub-
stantial moderated relationship. In the context of two states with
identical above average GOP control (1SD above the mean), a state
with an above average child poverty rate would be predicted to have
a Shared Hope score over seven points higher than the state with
lower child poverty. It appears the extent of child poverty does impact
the behavior of legislators around this issue, but there is a partisan
cast to this responsiveness.
cases is an additional limitation that must be considered. Regardless, neither factor was
associated with state Shared Hope scores in any analysis.
73. We did not examine crime statistics as a measure of the CSEC problem. Under-
reporting and inconsistent definitions of CSEC on a state level make this data highly
problematic.
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Last, it was noted above that the time trend variables capture
the largest share of the variance in Shared Hope scores over these
years. In order to examine whether the variance captured by these
variables obscures other relationships we provide Model 5 which
presents the full Model 3 without the dichotomous year variables.
The primary impacts of dropping the trend controls are a large in-
crease in the coefficient of the Safe Harbor law variable as well as a
very large and significant effect of the presence of a state anti–human
trafficking task force. It is very likely that these two factors are major
drivers of the observed nation trend in activity with anti-CSEC legis-
lation. Once this trend is also controlled for (by including the dichot-
omous year variables), the magnitude and/or statistical significance
of these factors are reduced considerably. These analyses suggest
that the presence of a statewide anti–human trafficking task force
is one of the most influential single factors in these analyses. “State-
years” in which states have a task force have Shared Hope scores
roughly eight points higher than those without a task force. Given
that it is easy to imagine multiple scenarios in which the presence
of a task force might enhance the impact of other factors, we ex-
plored a number of interaction effects. Are task forces more influen-
tial in the context of GOP majorities, more Evangelicals, more female
legislators, or higher child poverty rates? In all cases, the impact of
task forces did not appear to be significantly moderated by other
state factors. However, one significant interaction effect, shown in
Model 6, indicated that the impact of task forces was influenced by
the presence of anti-trafficking NGOs. Displayed in Figure 6, this
2016] VOTING TO END VULNERABILITY 19
interaction interestingly suggests that the presence of more NGOs
in states with task forces has little impact on legislative activity.
However, in states that lack task forces, the presence of more NGOs
is associated with substantially higher Shared Hope scores. Based
on the estimates here, a state having an above average number of
NGOs can nearly compensate for the absence of an anti-trafficking
task force.
These results are all based on trends in the overall score which
is comprised of scores in six major categories of state legislation iden-
tified by Shared Hope International: Criminalization of Domestic
Minor Sex Trafficking, Criminal Provisions Addressing Demand,
Criminal Provisions for Traffickers, Criminal Provisions for Facilita-
tors, Protective Provisions for the Child Victim, and Criminal Justice
Tools for Investigation and Prosecution.74 It is possible that states
are doing more work in one area over another which could give us
a different picture of the types of approaches states are taking to
address CSEC. Of particular interest is the relative extent to which
state approaches emphasize criminalization and prosecution of per-
petrators as opposed to support and protection for victims of CSEC.
In order to examine whether the picture changes when we focus in
on different types of responses to CSEC we run two models (pre-
sented in Table 2), which examine state factors associated with state
74. 2015 REPORT CARDS, supra note 37, at 23.
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scores in the “Protective Provisions for the Child Victim” category and
the sum of state scores in the “Criminal Provisions” categories for
addressing demand, traffickers, and facilitators. The maximum score
in the Protective Provisions category is 27.5 and comprises roughly
the same proportion of the total index score. The three Criminal
Provision categories sum to a maximum score of fifty.
Table 2 contains three models. Model 1 is the full Model 3 from
Table 1 provided for purposes of comparison. Model 2 examines state
level factors associated with higher scores on the Criminal Provisions
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categories. The only factor significantly associated with more criminal
provisions is the percentage of Republican legislators. It appears that
as states have responded to increased pressure for anti-CSEC legis-
lation, legislatures under GOP control have been particularly likely
to pass legislation strengthening criminal prosecution of perpetrators.
Turning to Model 3, in contrast, we do not see a significant impact of
partisan control on whether states have been more active in passing
protective provisions for victims (protective provisions include CSEC
being fully decriminalized for minors; CSEC victims being able to
access support services through one or more non-punitive pathways;
statute of limitations being eliminated or substantially lengthened
to allow for adequate time for perpetrator prosecution; and CSEC
victims being provided with state child welfare services even if a
trafficker is not a family member or “caregiver”). The passage of pro-
tective provisions for victims does appear to be a nonpartisan issue.
States with more women legislators, more anti-trafficking NGOs, and
more white Evangelicals have substantially higher scores on this
measure of protective provisions. And as was the case in the models
examining the overall score, in both Models 2 and 3 the presence of
an anti–human trafficking task force and Safe Harbor laws are highly
significant in the absence of the variables capturing the trend of
increasing scores over time.
In sum, these analyses tell us a great deal about the likely
factors driving different degrees of development of comprehensive
anti-CSEC policies across states. The national trend of increasing
Shared Hope scores since 2011 is the product of state governments
and state bureaucracies implementing a wide range of changes in
their practices regarding CSEC. As we saw earlier, states with the
least comprehensive anti-CSEC policies in 2011 have experienced
the largest degrees of change as they attempt to catch up with rapidly
changing norms in this issue area. These changes have been fueled
by the diffusion of both legislation and institutions dedicated to the
reduction of human trafficking. The passage of Safe Harbor laws is
strongly associated with the passage of additional anti-CSEC legis-
lation, as is the creation of anti-trafficking task forces. The presence
and diffusion of anti–human trafficking task forces over this period
accounts for nearly a third of the explained within-state variation
in Shared Hope scores (in Models 5 and 6). The creation of new
institutions charged with pursuing policy change has been demon-
strated to be an extremely effective approach in other policy areas
and this appears to be the case for anti-CSEC legislation as well.75
75. See, e.g., Rebecca Sager & Keith Bentele, Coopting the State: The Conservative
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In addition to related legislation and task forces, these analyses
indicate that the states that have passed and implemented the most
comprehensive suites of anti-CSEC policies are those with more
GOP legislators, women legislators, and white Evangelicals. In this
type of cross-sectional analysis, these associations help us identify
the characteristics of states with more comprehensive anti-CSEC
legislation, but we can only speculate on the mechanisms linking
the characteristic and the outcome. This is the most straightforward
in the case of Evangelicals. The issue of human trafficking has been
a cause célèbre for Evangelical activists for many years.76 These
analyses suggest these Evangelical efforts have been successful al-
though whether these outcomes have been achieved through direct
lobbying, elevating this issue within the state Republican Party,
increasing the awareness of the broader public, or through other
means cannot be determined here. Due specifically to the tight bond
of Evangelical voters and organizations to the Republican Party, it
is not surprising that GOP-controlled legislatures have been more
active in passing anti-CSEC legislation. However, it is interesting
to note that the positive association of GOP majorities with compre-
hensive anti-CSEC policies is accentuated in states with more poor
children. Again, we can only speculate on the mechanism here, but
it appears that Republican state legislators may be more convinced
of, or motivated by, the problem of CSEC in states with larger popu-
lations of poor children and consequently children at risk of being
sexually exploited. Further, our analysis of different types of provi-
sions indicates that the partisan dynamic of GOP majorities imple-
menting more anti-CSEC legislation is driven by more aggressive
passage of criminal provisions in Republican-controlled legislatures.
Last, the presence of more female state legislators is associated with
higher Shared Hope scores. This association appears to be driven in
large part by protective provisions being much more likely to pass
in states with more women legislators.77
Finally, while our analyses initially appeared to suggest that
the presence of anti-trafficking NGOs have had little impact on
state adoption of anti-CSEC legislation, our subsequent analyses
suggest that the impact of NGOs is conditional and associated with
particular legislative responses to CSEC. First, we found that the
presence of more NGOs is associated with substantially higher scores
Evangelical Movement and State-Level Institutionalization, Passage, and Diffusion of
Faith-Based Initiatives, 7 RELIGIONS 1, 1–3 (2016) (discussing the creation of faith-based
governmental off ices).
76. See id.
77. See infra Table 2; cf. Center for Women Policy Studies, Resource Guide for State
Legislators: Model Provisions for State Anti-Trafficking Laws (July 2005), http://www
.ncdsv.org/images/Resource%20Guide%20for%20State%20Legislators%20Trafficking.pdf.
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in states without an anti–human trafficking task force, and having
an above average number of NGOs was found to nearly compensate
for the absence of a task force. However, in states with task forces,
the number of NGOs appears to matter much less. And this is not
necessarily a bad thing, as the creation of task forces outsources
some of the work of NGOs to a state-funded institution.78 Second,
the influence of NGOs may also be operating through second order
effects. For example, the presence of more NGOs is one of the only
significant factors associated with the passage of a Safe Harbor law
and the presence of these laws is strongly associated with the pas-
sage of additional anti-CSEC legislation. Last, we found that the
presence of more anti-trafficking NGOs is unambiguously associ-
ated with more protective provisions for child victims, a major goal
of many of these organizations.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
We must continue the significant trend of states passing in-
creasingly more comprehensive prevention, protection, and prosecu-
tion state-level CSEC legislation each year. Raising a state’s Shared
Hope Report Card score by 3–8 points may not seem like much, but
each additional 2.5 points represents a policy that can make real-life
changes for sexually exploited children.79 These points represent safe
housing for CSEC victims, increased penalties for traffickers and
exploiters, no “age mistake” defense for buyers of sex, and includes
child pornography within the definition of CSEC.80 While the legis-
lative process can be abstract at times, a higher Shared Hope score
means increased services and human rights for CSEC victims, and
increased protections from exploiters for all vulnerable children.
Our analyses point to multiple potential avenues to drive this
change. Statewide human trafficking task forces are poised to provide
ongoing leadership as their presence fosters the passage of increas-
ingly comprehensive legislation. Therefore, we urge the maintenance
of such task forces by the majority of states who currently employ
this effective advocacy tool, and the creation of task forces by the
four states currently lacking a task force. We also urge all states to
pass Safe Harbor legislation to ensure CSEC victims are protected
from criminalization and provided with long-term, essential services.
In addition to these direct benefits to victims, the passage of Safe
Harbor legislation appears to substantially increase the likelihood
of the passage of additional anti-CSEC legislation. Our analyses also
78. See infra Figure 6.
79. See 2014 REPORT CARDS, supra note 40, at 21–25.
80. Id. at 21–23.
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illustrate the efficacy of the entry of Evangelical activists and orga-
nizations into state Republican Party politics for shaping legislative
outcomes. Anti-CSEC organizations and activists may see dividends
by emulating this model or at least by building relationships or
coalitions with the faith-based organizations that have already culti-
vated such political ties. That said, while we find a moderate parti-
san skew, in that Republican controlled legislatures have been more
likely to increase criminal penalties for traffickers and buyers, we
find no partisan dynamic in the passage of provisions protecting
victims. Further, all states regardless of partisan control, have sub-
stantially improved their CSEC policy frameworks in recent years.
In the big picture CSEC legislation has largely been a bipartisan
issue in this era of partisan gridlock.81 Consequently, advocacy orga-
nizations should continue to build connections and inroads to state
party organizations in both parties.
The specific implications of our analyses for anti-trafficking
NGOs are less clear. Given that our variable is the number of anti-
trafficking NGOs, the takeaway appears to be that more is better.
The presence of more NGOs is associated with stronger protections
for victims, more comprehensive CSEC legislation in states without
task forces, and the passage of Safe Harbor laws. Overall, it appears
that, as advocates would hope, the more organizational resources
directing funding and awareness toward the issue of human traffick-
ing the more active state legislatures have been. Last, our finding that
more comprehensive, and particularly more protective provisions,
addressing CSEC have passed in the presence of more female legis-
lators suggests that anti-CSEC advocates have an interest in support-
ing the expansion of the number of women legislators and success
of female political candidates.
CONCLUSION
State legislation is essential in determining what CSEC-specific
services and protections commercially sexually exploited children
can receive.82 The TVPA clearly articulates that all commercially
sexually exploited persons under the age of eighteen are considered
victims of human trafficking, regardless of proof of force, fraud, or
coercion.83 However, forty states still criminalize commercially sexu-
ally exploited children, often citing the need to detain “uncooperative”
exploited youth or under the guise of protection from traffickers and
81. See infra Figure 4.
82. See 2014 REPORT CARDS, supra note 40, at 1; infra Table 2.
83. 28 U.S.C.A. § 7102(9)(A).
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exploiters when comprehensive, trauma-informed shelters and social
services are not available.84 Consequently, it is not enough to simply
decriminalize CSEC on paper. We must increase funding for exist-
ing evidence-based CSEC programming, as well as expand crucial
services such as sustainable housing, job skills training, and health
care to offer long-term, sustainable protections for CSEC victims.
The recently passed Justice for Victims Trafficking Act (JVTA)
did create a “Domestic Trafficking Victims’ Fund” to help subsidize
victims’ services; however, the fund is financed through fines of prose-
cuted traffickers and buyers of sex.85 While prosecution of human
trafficking cases is on the rise worldwide, buyers of sex have very low
conviction rates and often utilize plea bargains to evade full culpa-
bility.86 Additionally, law enforcement officials have reported that
they do not want to arrest perpetrators of sexual violence to save
them from the embarrassment and stigma from having to register
as sex offenders.87 Therefore, we cannot rely primarily on the crimi-
nal justice system to sustain these critical services.
We must also acknowledge the racist origins of human trafficking
legislation to ensure this racial bias does not continue, particularly
by the criminal justice system which currently detains children of
color at disproportionally higher rates than whites.88 The very term
“human trafficking” originated from the 1900s term “white slave
traffic,” which only acknowledged the abduction of white women and
girls to the exclusion people of color who were also forced into prosti-
tution at that time.89 This prevailing narrative reinforces structural
barriers such as racism, poverty, homelessness, homophobia, economic
inequality, and classism that fuel the cycles of sexual exploitation.90
84. See Linda M. Williams, Harm and Resilience among Prostituted Teens: Broadening
Our Understanding of Victimisation and Survival, 9 SOC. POL’Y & SOC’Y 243, 252 (2010);
see also SHARED HOPE INTERNATIONAL, JuST Response State Mapping Report: A Review
of Current Statutes, Systems, and Services Responses to Juvenile Sex Trafficking, 1, 13
(2015), http://sharedhope.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/JuST-Response-Mapping-Report
-Final-web.pdf.
85. Steps to Safety, supra note 36, at 7.
86. Vanessa Bouche, Amy Farrell, & Dana Wittmer, Identifying Effective Counter-
Traff icking Programs and Practices in the U.S.: Legislative, Legal, and Public Opinion
Strategies that Work, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE at ii (Jan. 2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf
files1/nij/grants/249670.pdf.
87. See ROSE CORRIGAN, UP AGAINST A WALL: RAPE REFORM AND THE FAILURE OF
SUCCESS 89 (2013).
88. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 17 (2012).
89. Campus Coalition Against Trafficking, Timeline of Human Traff icking, RUTGERS
UNIV. (2016), http://www.eden.rutgers.edu/~yongpatr/425/final/timeline.htm [http://perma
.cc/YEG845Y5].
90. Jamaal Bell, Race and Human Trafficking in the U.S.: Unclear but Undeniable,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 10, 2010, 3:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jamaal-bell
/race-and-human-traffickin_b_569795.html [https://perma.cc/W2CSNNSF].
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Additionally, law enforcement and court officials must receive
trauma-informed training on the re-traumatizing effects of confron-
tation with authority figures, physical restraint, and/or confinement
for CSEC victims. Deeming a child as “uncooperative” by police officers
or judges is the second most common justification for detaining CSEC
victims.91 Reactions that may be considered “disrespectful,” such as
swearing, spitting, hitting, and self-harm are developmentally appro-
priate for people with severe trauma histories, but are often per-
ceived “non-compliant.” 92 This is especially true for girls because
they are acting outside of prescribed feminine ideals and can, there-
fore, be seen as “deviant.” 93 Thus, police and judicial protocols for
CSEC victims’ interactions must become trauma-informed in order
to understand the neurobiological responses of traumatized children.
Furthermore, we must change our current cultural narrative
that idealizes childhood as a time of innocence. Children who do not
fit a prescribed “innocence mold” may be labeled as “bad kids,” not
deserving of protection and services.94 This model of innocence re-
quires that children be white, heterosexual, and have little or no sex-
ual knowledge (even if sexual knowledge has been obtained through
sexual violence).95 Additionally, they should have access to quality
education, adequate healthcare, and must live in secure housing
within a heterosexual nuclear family.96 The experience of CSEC vic-
tims is often so far outside of this model that they can be seen as
complicit in their exploitation and viewed as criminals, thereby
further reinforcing cycles of violence instead of offering hope and
healing necessary for kids to thrive.97
Further research is needed to determine the extent to which these
cultural issues are associated with the prevalence of CSEC and the ex-
perience of CSEC victims on a broader scale. Our current under-
standing of these concerns is based on anecdotal evidence from human
trafficking and children’s human rights advocates. Findings from such
studies can help illuminate questions such as which factors are signifi-
cantly associated with states’ criminalization of prostitution for minors
and why more children of color are arrested for CSEC than whites.
91. Stephanie Halter, Factors that Influence Police Conceptualization of Girls Involved
in Prostitution in Six U.S. Cities: Child Sexual Exploitation Victims or Delinquents?, 15
CHILD MALTREATMENT 152, 153–57 (2010).
92. Id. at 155; Kate Price, Longing to Belong: Relational Risks and Resilience of U.S.
Commercially Sexually Exploited Children (Jean Baker Miller Training Institute, Wellesley
Centers for Women, Wellesley College, Working Paper No. 111, Aug. 2012).
93. See Saar et al., supra note 14, at 26.
94. Price, supra note 92, at 1.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 4.
